at Georgetown University. With a tally of no less than three viruses, each announced as a probable human cancer agent by its discoverers, the SVCP might seem well on target in its goal of developing a human cancer vaccine or other antiviral magic bullet.
Although this is how the public and Congress may see it, the SVCP is held in rather lower esteem among the scientific community, particularly by those best qualified to assess the program's contribution.* "The SVCP has been extremely ineffective and maybe has even had a negative effect," says one distinguished cancer researcher. "I hear nothing but complaints about the SVCP. Its main trouble is that it doesn't have much of an intellectual base; it has Huebner's enormous energies, one very good person-George Todarobut most of the contractees are pretty mediocre"-runs the verdict of a wellestablished biologist. An eminent West Coast virologist complains, "The SVCP is a masquerade; they make continuous proclamations of progress to justify the vast amounts of money being spent. But the nature of the program is that it excludes people who are highly critical. It has created a kind of stampede in which everyone * Apart from officials of the SVCP, almost all scientists interviewed for this article asked that their names not be mentioned, many citing the risk of being denied funds, since, as one scientist said, "the NCI has a history of vindictiveness."
Almost without exception the scientists quoted are both eminent and active in virology or related fields.
rushes lemming-like in the same direction, and critical discussion, points of obvious contradiction, are ignored."
Several virologists blame the moonshot-style approach of the program for what they see as its lack of evident intellectual underpinning. The present emphasis on finding a human cancer virus is regarded by some virologists as more a political than a scientific goal, designed to impress politicians and sustain the program's funding momentum. (For unless human cells differ from mouse and chicken cells, it is already clear that their genetic inheritance includes the specifications for a virus; the physical isolation of a human-derived virus will not lead to an understanding of the fundamental aspects of cancer and celi biology, which are given less attention by the SVCP.)
The success or otherwise of the SVCP is of topical interest not just because of the fanfare over the recent human virus claims, but also because of the impending reorganization of the NCI hierarchy caused by the new cancer funding. (There are also signs that the programmatic approach of the SVCP is likely to be extended to other areas of cancer research-the NCI has let a $800,000 contract to a firm of systems analysts to develop a "national cancer plan.") The major criticisms made of the SVCP are that it uses a wasteful method of supporting research, allows too much power to individual scientists to channel resources in a single direction, has failed to develop an intellectual base for its overall research strategy, and excludes critics and outside advice.
The SVCP has its admirers and positive achievements, but the existence of criticisms such as these, whether justified or not, shows that the program has not won the hearts and minds of the academic world. Yet the SCIENCE, VOL. 174 administrators of the SVCP seem to have little inkling of the dissidence in the world outside, or at least have taken no steps to cope with it. Officially, everything is running as smoothly as the arrows on the SVCP master plan, an assortment of interconnected boxes that bear labels such as "decision point' and "immunological control," and which embody the "research logic flow" for licking cancer.
The Almost unive-rsal is the criticism that, for lack of outside advice and the checks and balances that govern other research programs, the principal officers of the SVCP have too much power. "I feel enormous uneasiness about the power the branch chiefs wield," says a virologist under contract to the SVCP. "It's just plain wrong. If some check cannot be put on them, then we are going to see an incredible fiasco should their judgment prove wrong." Huebner, Todaro, and Manaker each control sums of money that equal or exceed the $6 million disposed of by the entire NIH virology study section in fiscal 1971.
Almost all research supported by the NIH is financed by grants, which are allocated by a system of peer review and are not tied down to specific objectives. By contrast, the SVCP distributes all its monies in the form of contracts, which are not subject to peer review. This applies not only to clearly definable projects such as the preparation of viruses or the collection of human tissue specimens, but also to research work that, in many instances, is no different in kind from -that supported by the grant system. The SVCP's exclusive reliance on contracts is considered one of its more unpopular features in the academic world. His contracts are a hodgepodge-if they interconnect, no one has ever seen the interconnection." The same scientist adds: "The bulk of the program is still a bunch of really worthless junk, such as injecting monkeys with God knows what and other holdovers from the early days of the program."
As far as this reporter has been able to discern, there are, in effect, two different SVCP's, neither of which has very much to do with the other except for the sharing of resources. Both programs have their good points, but both are probably the worse off for being largely closed to genuine outside review. One program is that administered by Huebner and Todaro, both of whom actively participate in the research they direct and have clear ideas of the direction in which they wish the program to go. The free-for-all over the candidate human cancer viruses and the setup of the segment working panels raises the question of who runs the SVCP. Several sources state that Moloney, the formal head of the program, cannot control Huebner because of Huebner's close relationship with Baker; Moloney does the best he can within the rules set by Baker, these sources say. In fact, there may be some advantage in the diversity allowed by the lack of central control. Scientists in the Huebner-Todaro camp like to depict the Manaker-Moloney-Rauscher part of the program-called for convenience the administrators' SVCP-as a ragbag of unproductive contracts based on outmoded approaches. This is closer to parody than truth; the administrative part of the program may not have the same drive and sense of direction as the Huebner-Todaro part, but the average standard of its contracts has in the last 2 years improved considerably, scientists both within and outside the program say. This is partly because of the scarcity of funds from other sources, partly because because he has a very good intuition, which is important in science," this critic adds.
The disadvantage of Huebner's dual role as scientist and administrator is that he is put in the position of awarding or denying research support in a field in which he has an active personal interest. He and Todaro are felt by many scientists involved in the SVCP to be more concerned with the success of their own research interests than with the welfare of the program as a whole. "Huebner is very active at trying to get the best part of every pie. I have heard him pooh-pooh things simply because they weren't part of his program," says one SVCP contractor. Many virologists are alarmed at the "unidirectional"-approach of the SVCP, or at least the Huebner-Todaro part of it, which seems designed almost exclusively to provide support for the oncogene theory, a set of ideas that have been vigorously espoused by Huebner.
The publicity-tinged style of Huebner's operation, his practice of signing papers written by contractors in fardistant laboratories (in fact contracting scientists tend to add Huebner's name to their papers on a Herr Professor basis, and Huebner does often contribute significant ideas), a recent incident in which scientists in Huebner's camp (Todaro and (neither of whom was on SVCP funds at the time, though the program supplied Baltimore with virus) and the group-specific antigens of C-type (gs) viruses first discovered by Huebner and colleagues in 1964.
Huebner states that the pace of discovery is proceeding "10 to 20 times faster than it would without the SVCP." In fact, it is probably too early to say whether the hectic pace imposed by Huebner's methods of massed laboratory attack on a problem will really speed solutions to basic problems. For example, he and other SVCP officials claim that as a result of SVCP emphasis, "The reverse transcriptase story is worked out to an extent that would have taken 10 years under the grant program." But scientists outside the program are not so sure. Rauscher proudly claims that the SVCP made available $4.5 million of virus for researchers studying the enzyme. "It was because of this that all this terrible work appeared in the last year," says a scientist prominent in the reverse transcriptase field. Several virologists believe that under a grant program the reverse transcriptase would have unfolded at a slower but sounder pace. There seems to be greater consensus that Huebner's fantastically expensive work on viral gs antigensto make 1 gram of antigen, which is enough to raise antibodies in tea guinea pigs, costs about $1 million-would stand little chance of being funded under a grant program and is a plus for the contract mechanism.
As for the administrators' part of the SVCP, there have certainly been successes in the past, notably the farsighted provision for mass producing viruses before the research demand developed. 
